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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

BENJAMIN B. ALWARD,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

No. 7649

R. E. GREEN, doing business as
NATIONAL SCHOOL ASSEMBLIES,

Defendant-Respondent.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF

·NATURE- OF THE CASE
.. The appellant, Benjamin B.. Alward, who resides at 148
First-· Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, ;her~inafter- designated
as t~e plaintiff, brought this action to recover -f!om the respq~
dent, R. E. Green, doing business as Nat~onal_ School.Assem3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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blies, hereinafter designated as the defendant, the sum of
Nine Thousand ( $9,000.00) Dollars, plus interest and costs,
by rea"son of an alleged breach of contract which had existed
between them.
The defendant is a non-resident natural person living in
Los Angeles, California. In order to secure jurisdiction of his
person the plaintiff served summons upon one of the defendant's alleged agents in conformance with then existing Sections
104-5-11(10) and 104-3-26.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
which provided the procedure for securing jurisdiction of nonresident persons doing business within the state of Utah.
Plaintiff first served one of defendant's alleged agents
with summons in case No. 857;6 in the Third District Court
of Salt Lake County on March 31, 1949. Defendant thereafter appeared specially and moved the court to quash service
of summons on the ground that the defendant was not subject
to the jurisdiction of the Utah court within the purview of
the aforementioned sections of our law. After a complete
hearing the court, Hon. Joseph G. Jeppson presiding, .overruled defendant's motion to quash service of summons, signed
findi~gs of fact and conclusions of law and ordered defendant
to appear and plead in the action.
Soon thereafter the defendant succeeded in re-opening
the matter upon discovery that the time and place of service
was not endorsed upon the copy of the summons given defendant's agent and successfully persuaded the court to reverse
its position. The motion to quash was then granted defendant.
This was done upon the strength of the case of T hornas v.
4
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District Court--of .Third Jttdicial District in and for ·Salt Lake
County. 110 Ut~ 2.45, 171 P. 2d 667.
Plaintiff then made a second service upon another alleged
agent at a later date, but voluntarily dismissed the entire action
lt pon learning that another technicaiity would bar him inasmuch as summons hadn't ttissued,, (been placed in the hands
of a proper person for purposes of service--former Section
104-5-5; now Rule 4 (a) and (b), lJtah Rules of Civil Procedure) within the three-month period allowable.
Thereupon a new complaint was filed and a new action
was commenced in the same court, No. 88052 (the case at
bar) , and plainti...ff proceeded to make proper service on yet
another of defendant's alleged agents. This third service was
made on January 16, 1950.
Once again the defendant appeared specially to quash
the service on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction of the· person
of the defendant in accordance with Rules 4 (e) ( 10) and 17
(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure--which had by then replaced Sections 104-5-11.10 and 104-3-26.10. After a hearing
on the matter the court, Hon. Albert H. Ellett presiding, decided in favor of the defendant, thus creating two contrary
rulings on basically the satne set of facts.
On December 29, 1950 (R. 25) the court signed an Order
quashing the service of summons, in substance as follows:
IT IS 1-IEREBY ORDERED that the service
of summons upon the defendant . in this action be,
and is, quashed, annulled and set aside for lack of
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant.''
_

cc

•

•

•
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It was from the foregoing Order that the plaintiff petitioned the Supreme Court of the State of. Utah for an Order
granting an intermediate appeal, and on February 19, 1951
this court granted an appeal.

FACTS OF THE CASE
The facts of the case as brought out on the hearings
and which defendant will undoubtedly agree to be so except
insofar as they involve any commitment by him jeopardizing
his position in a -trial on the merits of the case are as follows:
The defendant operates an organization which supplies
artists and attractions for the purpose of giving performances,
primarily to schools, throughout the western United States.
These programs are presented by talent furnished by the
defendant under the terms of contracts which he makes with
the various schools. In order to fulfill these contracts the defendant enters into contracts of a different nature with a
group of approximately twenty or more artists, of which the
plaintiff was one, to give such performances as and when
scheduled.
The plaintiff and the defendant signed a contract (R. 3-4)
on February 10, 1947, whereby plaintiff was to give performances to school assembly programs on· rr Australia," consisting
of a lecture illustrated with colored motion pictures, as directed.
The contract was to expire on June 1, 1950, at the end of the
school year 1949-50. The plaintiff was booked to perform
in many schools in several states, including ctnearly every school
in Utah." (Ex. C.)

6
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.Plaintiff _had_ fulfilled a regular ·"'eek's perfo_r~ances as
the latter part of January,
scheduled on a Friday afternoon
1949, the year of the ubig winter." He \Vas in eastern Orego~
at the time and was proceeding to travel eastward via Soda
~ prings, Idaho> in order to r\:~lch the state of South Dakota.
The distance involved necessitated continuous travel in order
that he be in South Dakota in tin1e to give scheduled performances the following 1\1onday morning. He traveled by auto-

in

mobile.
At Burley, Idaho, he was advised (Exh. A-A, p. 9) that
roads to the east \vere snowbound and that he should travel eastward via Ogden (Weber canyon). However, upon reaching
Snowville, Utah, he encountered a blizzard which continued
southward at least as far as Salt Lake City. Due to the weather
conditions he did not attempt to travel through Weber canyon
but came into Salt Lake City, \\rhere he became snowbound for
some twelve to fourteen days.
While in Salt Lake City the plaintiff corresponded with
defendant. As a result of this correspondence and because of
his not reaching South Dakota plaintiff received a letter from
the defendant whereby the .latter cancelled the remainder of
the plaintiff's tour of the midwest for the year and terminated
plaintiff's contract (Exh. A). The plaintiff thereupon commenced the action now before the court.

STATEMENT· OF POINTS
Plaintiff-appellant submits the following points as reasons
for seeking reversal of the ·lower court's ruling:
7
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( 1) The court erred in holding that the defendant, by and
through R. W .. Dill, the agent upon whom service of summons
was made, was not doing business at the school where the
service of summons was made, within the contemplation of
Rule 17 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;

( 2) The court erred in holding that the school at which
defendant's agent was served was not a place of business within
the contemplation of said Rule 17 (e) ;

( 3) The court erred in holding that the cause of action
did not arise out of the conduct of business done in the State
of Utah, within the contemplation of said Rule 17 (e).

'

ARGUMENT

(I)
The court erred in holding that the defendant, by and
through R. W. Dill, the agent upon whom service of summons
was .made, was not doing business at the school where the
service of summons was made, within the contemplation of
Rule 17 (e), Utah Rules of Cit'il Procedure.

This appeal will center around the interpretation to be
given to Rule 17 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which
had just been adopted at the time of the service of summons
involved. This rule was substantially identical with former
Section 104-3-26.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 ( 1947) Laws:
Rule 17 (e) Action Against a Non-resident doing
Business in this State.
8
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When a .non-resident person is associated· i_q. and conducts bl!Siness within the State of lJtah in one. or more
places in his ovlli name or- a common trade name, and
said business is conducted under the supervision of
a manager. superintendent, or agent, said person may
b~ sued li1 his oY. n H,lcle in any action arising out of the conduct of said business.
The manner of service of process in such cases is prescribed
by Rule 4 (e) ( 10) :
Rule 4( e) ( 10) Personal service in this State.
Upon a natural person, non-resident of the State of
Utah, doing business in this State at one or more places
of business, as set forth in Rule 17 (e) , by delivering
a copy thereof to the defendant personally or to one
of his managers, superintendents or agents.
Inasmuch as no findings of fact and conclusions of law
were prepared in support of the court's order, nor need they
be prepared in view of Rule 52 (a), lJtah Rules of Civil Pro·Findings of fact and conclusions
cedure, which states
of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule
12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in Rule 41 (b),"
reference will be made to the court's memorandum decision
at the close of the hearing, which forn'led the basis for the
order quashing service of sun1mons (Rec. 52-56, inc.)
n

•

•

•

The defendant is a non-resident natural person conducting
business in the State of Utah under the common trade name
of National School Asemblies. This the defendant admits
(R. 10, 11), but he maintains that the orily business done in
Utah by him is through his booking agents who call at schools
throughout the state in the fall of ~ach year f~r t~e purpose
9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as

of booking engagements with the schoolsartists (such as plaintiff). Throughout this
carefully point out that in actual practice it is
are the agents for the defendant and not the
is the agent for the artists as maintained by

agenis for the
brief we shall
the artists who
defendant who
him.

In its memorandum decision the court (R. 53, 54) indicated that Jackson Junior High School in Salt Lake City, was
not a place of business of the defendant nor was the agent doing business at that place. The ruling is not entirely clear,
but, if so, the most that can be said is that part of it is immaterial. The discussion follows:
THE COURT: I will rule that he did not maintain a
place out of which he did business, but I will rule that he did
do business in more than one place.
MR. IVERSON: Will Your Honor rule on this point, that
the service upon him at a school was a place of business within
the contemplation of this statute so that we can have that
taken care of ?
THE COURT: I will rule that he was served in Salt Lake
·City, a place where he had done business.
MR. IVERSON: Well, will Your Honor rule this, that
the service upon him at the school was a proper service because
it was a place of business?
THE COURT: I will rule that it was not a place of business of the defendant.
· MR. IVERSON: That it was not a place of business of
· the defendant within the contemplation of that section?
10
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THE COURT·: _Well, :1 am going· -to leave -that·.question
to the Supreme Court as_ to \vhether it has to. be a place of
business of the defendant.
MR. IVERSON: Of course, if Your I-Ionor rules on that,
'':e will have something to present to the Supreme Court.
THE COURT: I will hold that he was served at Salt Lake
City, a place where he had done business, but that he was not
doing business within the contemplation of this statute in
(Jackson Junior High), the place where the service was n1ade.
(Further Discussion)
Let us examine the foregoing in the light of Rule 17 (e) .
As can be seen, the Court in its first statement above indicated
that it would hold the defendant «« • • • did do business in more
than one place." Then, in the last foregoing sentence, says,
«« • • • he was not doing business within the contemplation of
this statute in ... the place where service was made."
It can readily be seen that the defendant could not be doing business at Jackson Junior High School while being a nonresident except- through one of his agents. Let U:s examifi'e
what occurred at that school on January 16, 1950, the date of
servtce.
R. W. Dill, the person served, and his brother wer-e giving
an assembly program to the student body at Jackson J~nior
High School. They v1ete replacing another program· (Nevin
Magicians) which the defendant's booking agents had previously booked for that date, but which was replaced for some
reason. f . . t any rate, the. schooL was obligated to accept the
11
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1

bill Bi-others by reaso11 .of the defendant's contract with the

' school which provided:

.

. '·

_cc_ ... If .an a~traction booked herein cannot perform
·' . as scheduled, ap.o-the'r attraction of equal quality will
· :- be acc;epte~ by_the spo~ors.n (Recp~d 1_8)..
' · Of course, defendant· will and has maintained that these
·contracts are those .of t~e artists inasmuch ·as· he_. merely: runs
an c,cemployme,nt agen~y" ~nd· th~t he' is' the agent and the ~rtist
is the'principal. Howeyer, the facts clear1y show that the defendant operates ~-.large~ <?rganizat~?·n,- having ~booked Hnearly
evety school in the. stat~ of Utah" '(Ex. C). It---is inter~sting
to note that defendant has told his talent:" cc_If we did not do
-

.. .l.

-. --.

•

'

~

.J

a terrific volume of busin~ss -~~'"~auld not be in business ,today

-·" (EX h • T) •

~

• • •

.-

· Defendant .cannQ~ successfully maintain that the Dill
·:Brothers were-per~5>rmjng an-d f~lfillirig 'their:own~contratt with
the schools in view of _his own 'very carefully· worded affidavit
-in ·support-of .his. motion to· quash ·service of·summons wherein
he acknowledges (R." 1_1) __that the- bookings solicited by his
agents ... rr beconz~ a~ binding contract upon the defendant." .
· The contracts are tl!o~~ of the defendant alone!
. - ·, --?~~·-. _..;..

That being the ca~e th~ only conclusion that can be reached
-is- that the Dill Br9tpers w~re performing ·a -legally binding
obligation o£ .the defend~,f2t. Further; Mr. Dill's own testitnony
(R. 3'8) indicates that th~ir. story "fo the ·school at.· the com·
. mencement of a pxogram. was: c'\X'e . ~re the Dill Brothers, Ro'
·· and Bob, -and we·.hay~· ~~en sent by' National School Assem·
- olies:" At the end of the program ~they would . say~ ((We
c

'-

-

..

.

I.

. 12
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. are ·very _happy .to :P~fforqt before you and~_.yery happy. that
National School Assernblies has n1ade __i~ possible :fo~ .1:1~. ~o
come your way." These staten1ents were made according to
instructions given to all talent ( Exh. G-iten1s 54 and 55).
If the fulfilling of a contract isn't ndoing business" what
is ? The artists 'vere consumating the very essence of the
subject-matter of the contract. Furthern1ore, upon con1pleting
their performance they collected the amount due under the
contract, kept their share and remitted the balance to the defendant at the end of the week. Receiving one's pay for a job
well done is the final act of ndoing business." In fact, their
contract 'vith the defendant (R. 14 ( 6)) requires such collection to be made as also do the ((Suggestions to Talent" sent
out by the defendant (Exh. R) which provide:
'"26. You are responsible for making collections in

schools. In fact, that is one of the most important parts
of your contract . . . ''
.
.
Now, if the defendant still maintains that the Dill
Brothers and other artists were merely fulfilling their OV{n contracts which the defendant had secured for them as their agent
how can he explain the fact that the Dill Brothers ·entered
into their contract with the defendant on Sept. 9, 1949 (R.
14), the contract to be effective not before .January 1st, 1950;
but the contract under which they were giving a performance
at the time of service of summo.ns was entered into on October
20, 1948 (R. 18), nearly a year before the circuit engaged them
and more than a y~ar b~fofe their contract beca1ne effective
with the defendant?· (Supported by affidavits _of school principals-R. 16-19, inc.; 21.,-23, inc.; Exh. _·G,_ Item 20). To. say

13
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that the defendant's booking agents made the contract as agents
for ~ principal that was non-existent and unknown would seem
to be stretching agency law to the limit. The simple truth is
that the performers were in reality agents of the defendant
despite his protestations to the contrary. The lower court has
so held.
Plaintiff submits that the performance of the defendant's
contract and the collection of the money therefor, part of which
belonged to the performer and part of which belonged to the
defend~nt (R. 55-Court'_s Memo. Dec.) constituted ndoing business'' by the agent. In fact, the events at the schools
by the artists would seem to constitute the most active type of
ndoing business."
Most of the cases concerned with defining the phrase (!doing business" have been those involving corporations. Black's
Law Dictionary, Third Ed., p. 605, condenses the many cases
on the subject, setting forth the following ingredients:
'' . . . The doing of business is the exercise in the
state of some of the ordinary functions for which the
corporation was organized . . . What constitutes 'doing business' depends on the facts in each particular
case . . . The activities of the corporation, however,
must represent a more or less continuous effort . . .
or be of a systematic and regular nature .. . The transaction of a single piece of business is not enough ... "
Here we have an organization which sends out agents
each year to book engagements throughout the state of Utah.
In performing under the contracts made a large group of
artists traverse the state in waves, a new one arriving in the

14
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wake of the one leaving~ This continues from. 28 to· 3.2 .weeks
each year ·(Exh. C), or in all, the bulk of- the. school year.
The activities are the culmination of the basic purpose of the
organization, and are continuous, systematic and regular .
.r\t this point it is well to point out that the defendant did
not and has not now appointed an agent upon whom service
of process could be made (R. 24 - Plaintiffs Affidavit of
Effort to Locate Defendant) in accordance with Section 104·
5-11.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1943 (as added by Laws of
1947), which requires that:
(<Every non-resident person doing business as provided in Section 104-3-26.10 (now Rule 17 (e), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure) shall file or cause to be filed
a certificate, under oath, with the Secretary of the State
of Utah, setting forth the name and place of business
of his manager, superintendent, or agent upon whom
service of summons may be had and shall file said
certificate setting forth the name of said. manager,
superintendent, or agent on or before the 15th day
of January in each year \-Yith the Secretary of the State
of Utah." (Italicized portion added.)
It is quite apparent that our legislature inserted the foregoing provision into our la'v for the- purpose of providing a
method whereby any Utah citizen could serve summons upon
a non-resident doing business in this state who operated from
no given office, such as· the defendant in this case. The unfortu- ·
nate thing, however, is that no penalties are provided for those
who do not register. Consequently, non~residents who operate in a manner similar to the defendant simply refuse to
register. since they v1ill lose- nothing thereby (the.t;e ~ave only

15
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been three non~residents who have des!grtated agents with
the Secretary of State according to the writer's inquiries) and,
when sued, can instruct their real agents to keep away from'
process servers. Note the amusing and interesting manner
by which this was done (Exh M-Letter to Donas) :
Mr. and Mrs. John Dona
General Delivery
New Meadows, Idaho

3 October, 1949

Dear friends:
Next week you start your tour in the state of Utah.
During the entire time that you are in the State of
Utah your t(Power of Attorney" is not to be in effect.
Nothing contained in our t(Suggestions to Talent,''
or any literature that might even tend to allow you to
be agent of our burea,u is in effect in the State of Utah.
If banks accept your signatures for cashing checks
made payable to National School .A.ssemblies they must
do so at their own risk . . .
Please be most careful about this at all times in Utah.
Cordially yours,
R. E. Green, Director
If one is so fortunate as to serve one of these agents
they then come into court on a special appearance, as here,
and claim that no agency relationship exists, or that they are
not ccdoing business" or that they are not doing business at
any place.
Surely the legislature intended that non-resident persons
doing business in the manner of the defendant were just the
very ones to be included within the scope of Rule 17 (e).

16
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(II)
The cottrt erred in holding that the school ttl tvhich defendant' J agent U'as ser-z;.ed lL'dS not a place of business tvitbin
the contenzplation of Sdid R1de 17 (e).
The court, as heretofore pointed out, stated that it would
hold that the agent \Yas served
in Salt Lake City, a place
where he had done business," and that Jackson Junior High
School, the place where service of summons was made was
not a place of business of the defendant." (R. 54).
H

Ct

•••

•••

It should be remembered, however, that the statute (Rule
17 (e) ) concerns itself with defendants who are doing business
in one or more places by means of managers, superintendents
or agents. It is not necessary that there be an established
office out of which business is done, but only that business is
done in one or more places. Nor does the place at which the
business was done have to be a place of business of the defendant-which carries the connotation of an office.
If this court concludes that the agents were doing business at Jackson Junior High School, the place where service
was made, then it must also conclude that that school was a
''place" within the contemplation of Rule 17 (e). Plaintiff
submits the common judgment would say that no person can
do any volume of business unless it is done at a place or places.
The very fact that the statute referred to "one or more places"
indicates that the legislature had in mind just such organizations as that of the defendant who travel sans offices-always
working out of a briefcase.

17
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Defendant may ·contend that Rule'"4. (e) (10),-previously
referred to, makes it mandatory that -service be made upon
an agent at sqme office or fixed place of business. In support
of such a v_j_~w h_e would h~ve to rely _o!l the wording of the
rule which follows: CCUpon a natural person, non-resident
of the State of Utah, doing business in this State at one or more
places of business . . . " (Italics add~d). Plaintiff submits,
howe¥er, that nothing contained in the foregoing phrase can
be so broadly construed as to give an inference that the statute
is so limited as to require that the places of business need be
fixed in the form of an office or some stationary headquarters.
But, should there ·be any doubt in the court's mind as to the
meaning of the legislature concerning the requirement of a
fixed place of business the plaintiff again calls attention to
Section 104-5-11.10, discussed heretofore, which requires that
non-residents doing business in this state designate an agent
upon whom service can be made. If Rule 17 (e) were so
narrow as to apply only to fixed offices or other- forms of stationary head9ua~ters of conducting business there would then
be little need for Section 104-5-11..10 since locating an agent
would be a simple matter.
Furthermore, Rule 4 (e) ( 10) relating to serv1ee does
not limit or qualify Rule 17 (e), nor can it since it is entirely
subordinate to Rule 17 (e). In fact, Rule 4 (e) ( 10) refers to Rule 17 (e) -directly: ccUpon a natural person, nonresident of the State of lJtah, doing business in this· State at
one· or more -places of business, as set forth in Rule 17 (e),
... " (Italics added). cThus; it. can be seen that.Rule 4 (e) (10)
deals only with·-the :method of service and does not qualify or
18
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- alter in any resl?ect the na~ure or manner of do~ng busi~ess,
either as to place, method or· locality.
If it be. argued that the agent served must be associated
\vith an office or son1e similar fixed place of business it would
be 'veil to compare the broad language of the Utah statute
and that of a somewhat similar Iowa statute (Sec. 11,079,
Iowa Code 1927, also 1931):
"\Vhen a corporation, company, or individual has,
for the transaction of any business, an office or agency
in any country other than that in which the principal
resides, service may be made on any agent or clerk
employed in such office or agency, in all actions .growing out of or connected with the business of that office
or agency.''
It can readily be seen that Rule 17 (e) is so written that
its intent was to include situations like the one at issue. If
it had intended that the rr place or places of business} as .ret forth
in Rule 17 (e) ... " should be limited to an office or agency
or other fixed place of business it would have been a very
simple matter for the legislature to have qualified Rule 17 (e)
as did the Iowa legislature. Since it did not it can only be
presumed that it intended that the law should not be so
narrow in its scope.
A simple analysis of the foregoing Iowa statute shows that
the agent must be fixed and established at a definite location.
But the distinction between the Utah and the Iowa statutes
becomes apparent in view of Utah's .law (104-5-11.10) re. quiring an agent to be designated for .purposes of service
whereas the Iowa statute has no need for such similar accom-
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panying legislation since it specifies which agent can, be served
within the very terms of the given statute.
Plaintiff submits that the facts of this case come within
the intent of the legislature in view of the wording of Rule
17 (e) in that ·s~rvi~e of summons was made upon an agent
of the defendant doing business in one or more places.

(III)
The court e1'red in holding that the cause of action did
not arise out of the conduct of business done in the State of
Utah, within the contemplation of said Rule 17 (e).
The lower court in its memorandum decision made a holdtng (R. 52) as follows:
THE COURT: I think I ought to rule that this defendant
had an agent in Utah but that the cauJe of action set forth does
not arise out of the conduct-! also ought to hold that Green
had done business in Utah but that the cause of action of Mr.
Alward's did not arise out of the conduct of such business in
Utah." (Italics added).
MR. DECKER: YoucHonor, I would like to interrupt for
.one point. That statute doesn't talk about -cause of action. It
talks about action. (Italics addeg).

The foregoing holding, in the opinion of the plaintiff,
raises a ·point-which is entirely immaterial to the case inasmuch
as the -court labored under the -·impression that the cause of
dction must arise in Utah. But '\Vhat does Rule 17 (e) provide:
20
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said person n1ay be sued. in his ow.n nan;te .i.n
any action arising out of the conduct of said b'lisiness."
(Italics added·.)
·
·
·
·

tt

•••

Similarly, the Iowa statute:
service rna y be made on any agent . . . in all
actions growing out of or connected with the business . . . " (Italics added).
tt

•

•

•

Now when the legislature used the word rr action" did
it mean rr c.111Se of action"? We think not. Iowa has said that
an ttaction," as the word in general statute of limitations, is
a proceeding in court, and a ((cause of action" is the fact or
facts which establish or give rise to a right action. (Dean v.
Iowa-Des Moines Nat. Bank & Trust Co.} 281 NW 714, 128
ALR 137).

One of the leading authorities in the United States pointing out the sharp distinction between the vlord ((action" and
the words ((cause of action" is a Utah case. ·It is DINSl\llORE
et al. v. BARKER, DISTRICT JUDGE, 61 Utah 33·2, 212
Pac. 1109. There, in pointing. out the distinction the court said:
((The word taction' is a generic term, having a broad
and comprehensive application, and, in the absence
of any restrictive word ... n1eans any legal proceeding
in a court for the enforcement of a right or for the
purpose of obtaining such a remedy as the law allows,
or a judicial proceeding which, if conducted to a termination, will result in a judgment . . . "
The case of ALWARD V. GREEN is an ((action." In
other words, the lawsuit alone is sufficient to qualify under
our statute. It is not necessary that the cause of action (which
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might ·technically ·arise upon mailing a --letter ·of termination
in Los Angeles· or ·washington, D.C., ·arid therefore have its
technical situs there) arise in this state, but only that the action
arise out of conduct of the defendant's business i~ this state.
As further authority pointing out the difference between
the terms action" and ((cause of action:"
C<

tcAn 'action' is the means that the law has provided
to put a (cause of action' into effect."
Woods tJ. Cook, 58 Pac. 2d 965 (California)
((An (action' is a means of redress of the legal wrong
described by the words (cause of action'."
Schueing v. State, 59 Southern 160.
tcUnder the federal rules, the term (action' does not
mean (cause of action,' which is substituted by the word
(claim'."
Winkelman vs. GMC, DC of NY 48 Fed. Supp. 490.
Inasmuch as the legislature provided that the action must
arise out of the ((conduct of said business" it provided a
suitable standard by which a non-resident will not be submitted
to lavisuits which arise out of business done in a state far
-beyond the confines- of Utah, which might be the case if the
technical situs of the cause of action is to be the place of suit.

By the very nature of modern business conduct it is easily conceivable that situations may arise where the action might arise
out of the conduct of business done within- this state and yet
the situs of the cau-se of action may arise in some other state.
Thus, the defendant would contend that although the action
may arise out of Conduct of business -done in .Utah, the technical
situs- of the cause --of action- is· in -California and arose· upon
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placing the letter of cancellation. in the mails. However, this
argument is beside the point in view of the express "'yording
of our statute.
No better discussion of this issue can be found than is
pointed out in the case of Caldtt'ellt'. At'mottr, 43 Atlantic 517
( 1899), before statutes similar to the Utah statute were considered constitutional, which stated:
((It has been suggested that we may hold the statutory
mode of service upon non-resident citizens valid only
in cases like the present one, where the cause of action
accrued in this state. The legislature has not so limited
the operation of the statute, and the courts have no
power to do so. The statute is general and applies equally to all cases of non-residents doing business in this
state, irrespective of the fact that the cause of action
accrued here or elsewhere. To hold this mode of service
upon a non-resident good where the cause of action
accrued in this state, and bad where the cause of action
accrued out of the state, would be wholly unwarranted
by the statute, and would be legislation by the court,
and not construction."
Our court has heretofore held the statute at issue to be
constitutional in the case of TV ein v. Crockett, 195 Pac. 2d 222
(Utah, 1948). In that case Justice Latimer in the majority
opinion indicated in several places that if a cause of action
arose in Utah '.' ... witnesses will be readily available." But,
as previously indicated, the reverse might be true, as would
be the case if a letter canceling a contract were mailed while
traveling on a train in say, Illinois, 1500 miles from any state
connected with the transaction out of which the action arose.
Actually, witnesses will be more readily available in th~ state
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where the· .transactions· out: of which the ·aotion ·arises should
occur.
In contrast. to the case at bar an. entirely ·different .set of
facts presented themselves in the W ein case. There was no
occasion to bring out the distinction between the terms (taction" and ttcause of action" in that case. In fact, the authorities cited in support of the constitutionality of a statute such
as ours failed to note the distinction, and used the terms interchangeably. In those places where Justice Latimer indicated
that the situs of the cause of action had anything to do with
the case his statements- were purely dicta and not significant
since there was no reason in the W ein case for making a distinction between the terms. Actually, his statements tending
to point out the distinction were just as numerous, such as the
following: ((By voluntarily doing business in this state, a non-

resident impliedly consents to being sued upon causes of
action arising out of the transaction of business in this state
. . ., " thus asserting that the cause of action need only arise
out of business done here, not that the cause of action must
arise here. Similar statements are found elsewhere in the
decision.

It appears that the fundam~ntal issue of this_ case is simply
this: Did the action arise out of the conduct of business in
the State of Utah within the me3:ning of Rule 17 (e) ?

Mr.- Alward; subn1its

that he was ~ngaged
tn the c~n4uct of_. defendant's business . in the state of Utah
duririg. the. 10. or -_~o: days i.t:nmediately · prec~ding the receipt

-!&e plaintiff,
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of the letter terminating the contract benveen him and the
defendant.
(

..

.

At the time the ·alleged <:ause of ~ction arose Mr. Alward
~ carrie'd· with him a power of attorney (Exh. F) which reads
as follows:
. .
\..

\.

....

. -..

\..~

'=-

.. • .. .

. ..

-~

\. _, .

t.

1~ September

. '"
·~.

t94s

-J

POWER OF ATTORNEY
This authorizes the bearer:
·- ~:· Mr. Benjamin B. Al~ard
--~
· who has countersigned below, to_ serve .as business
representative for National School Assemblies; to make
all settlem.eQ.ts1_ and to endo,rse and cash any checks
· made payable
Natio·na:l SchooL Assemblies.
This authoii~tiot? ·is,. ~oo,d until June 10, ·19~9 .

to

._·. NATIONAL SCHOOL-ASSEMBLIES
L

, · · - ~- ..__ -By .( s/d) R. E. Grf~n
.

.

.. )

"-

R. E. Green, -Director

{

·--'

Countersigned-: ( s/d) :_
BenjalJlin B. Alw-3.rd _
(Not_arized)

.

-'-

.

--

· This . power of~ a!torney was received -u~cler cover of a
letter '"(Exh;,.E) which reads in -part as follows:
TO THE MANAGER OF EACH ATTRACTION
·(tHerewith i-s yo~r tcPo~~r of Attorney." .. This. gives you the authority. to . do business for
_ N~tional School" Assemblies; .to sign_ ~r endorse and
·-· cash checks made ou.t to. National School.-Assemblies,
and otheryvise to ;ep~esen~ the ..;;organization in any business dealing! .
{Italics ·added)~.
I'

•

"
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4
,. : ,:· .

Plaintiff operated according . to the· . terms ·of a contract

(Exh. B) under which he v:as to· deliver performances in accordance with bi-weekly schedules to be delivered to him by
Mr. Green, and under which he was otherwise.~to perform
u as directed." He was directed in the performance of his
duties by a list of ((Suggestions to Talent" (~xh.

G)

and

periodic ''Special Bulletins to Talent" (Exh. S and T). The
.~

ttSuggestions to Talent" begin with the following pertinent
sentence which indicates that the defendant considered plaintiff's activities while in Utah as the "conduct of business:"
"In order that the Booking Bureau and the Talent
Attractions may better work in harmony and more
effectively serve the schools successfully and with a
minimQm of lost motion and friction, we offer the
following suggestions for the conduct of business."
(Italics added.)
Among the points relating to ttconduct of business" as
thereinafter specified are Schedules (items 1-4), Mail Points
(items 5-8); Cancellations (items 9-15), J\1aking Dates Assigned (item 16), Telegrams (items 17-18),.Publicity (items

29-24), ·Booking·· Additional Dates (item 25 ), Collections
(items 26-28); Change in the Hour of Assignment (items
29-30) ~ Conduct (items 3 5-6), ·Deductions for Missed Dates
(items 38-40), Remittances (item 56) and others.· Apparently
Mr ~ Green; the defendant, ·felt that the making of collections
and -remittances, the fulfilling of schedules and means· and
meth@d ·of travel,~ the sending and receiving of letters and
telegrams, ·the·· booking by talent

of

additipnal dates, means

of publicity, travel and preparedness-for winter (items 34 and
3 7) ,-- missed: dates: due to being snowbound,. the handling of
'26
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changes in assignments, etc.~ as a part of the ''conduct of his
business., As such the plaintiff's activities in Utah were con·
duct of business.
The "Special Bulletins to Talent'' refer to («people on

weekly salary," saying that "no talent would expect that we
pay salary for that week" (a week missed due to fl.oo~s or
snowblocked roads), and that rrwe wish u'e could pay you
all we think you are worth ... " and that tcthree of four-people
companies are not hit·ed for the same that single or double attractions are hired. (Italics added-Exh. T). Similar statements are found in Exhibits N, 0, and S. Mr. Green apparently
considered the talent as his hired employees, to be paid weekly
salaries out of his receipts. Consequently, plaintiff was an
agent of the defendant-probably an employee.
It seems clear from the evidence taken at the hearings
(Exh. A-A and Record 47-50, inc.) and from the exhibits
that Mr. Alward \Vas acting as agent and conducting business
for Mr. Green during the days immediately preceding the receipt by him of the letter terminating his contract. Specifically,
lvfr. Alward attempted to find his way through the snowblocked roads to fulfill his assignments in South Dakota, he
received and sent mail and telegrams necessary to the business
of Mr. Green, he made a remittance ( Exli. H) , he had telephone conversations with Mr. Green concerning the business
-all done while in the State of Utah. Mr. Alward notified
Mr. Green by mail and by telephone of the difficulty he was
encountering in getting through to the east over the snowblocked roads and of the improbability of success. Mr. Green
expressed dissatisfaction with Mr. Alward's efforts to .get
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through and- held a heated telephone conversation with the
plaintiff in which the latter was told, in substance, to make
sure that he got out of town by Friday (Exh. A-A). Mr.
Alward received a letter of termination (Exh. A) which was
posted. before ccfriday" Y:hile still in Salt Lake City. The
defendant failed to send further bi-weekly schedules as called
for in the contract, making it impossible for the plaintiff to
have performed had he could or would, and this lawsuit resulted from the happenings.
It can be seen that the controversy arose out of Mr.
Alward's alleged n1isconduct of defendant's business while in
Utah. The plaintiff's contention is that the defendant unjustifiably terminated and cancelled their contract, while the
defendant contends, or must contend, that the termination and
cancell-ation was justified. This problem must be determined
upon the merits of the matter.
After defe!J.dant had failed to provide schedules as called
for in their contract and had notified plaintiff that their contract . was terminated suit was brought in Utah because of
the obvious convenience to the plaintiff, who customarily resides
in Utah when not lecturing. The witnesses to the plaintiff's
efforts to find a way through the snowblock, the witnesses to
the conditions of the roads and the witnesses as to weather
conditions are in ·utah, and their testimony can much more
conveniently be had in Utah than in any other state.
The heart of the controversy necessarily boils down to a
question of whether Mr. Alward's failure to make his arrangements was justified by the road and weather conditions or
28

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

\vas ~1r. Green's failure to further ·perform under their contract and his termination thereof justified by circumstances
surrounding Mr. Alward's refusal or failure to tnake his assignments ? The answer is to be found in the testimony of
Utah witnesses and the action should therefore properly be
tried in Utah insofar as determining the case on its merits is
concerned.

A further point raised at the hearing in the lower court
concerned itself "rith whether the legislature intended to exclude suits by Utah agents against non-resident principals from
the benefits of Rule 17 (e). Plaintiff submits that such an
intent can not be read into the statute in absence of some express statement or qualification of the statute. Section 104-511.10, if complied with, permits any lTtah . resident, whether
agent, employee or otherwise, to _obtain personal service in
this state upon a non-resident. Surely the legislature intended
to extend the benefits of the law to all Utah residents, irrespective of whether or not they be agents or employees of the
defendant.
Plaintiff submits that the exhibits on file in this action,
standing alone, present the complete picture as effectively as
volumes of written brief in support of his contention that this
situation comes within the purview of Rule 17 (e) .

SUMMARY
Inasmuch as the constitutionality of the statute was decided affirmatively in the case of Wein v. Crockett, 195 Pac.
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2d 222 -in 1948, Jhe s0le issue involved i~ whether or not the
facts of ·this case come within the purview of Rule 17 (e) ..
In recent years statutes similar to our Utah statute have
become very numerous. As stated in 10 ALR 2d 200":
Today in most, if not all, states, jurisdiction
of a non-resident defendant, corporate or otherwise,
may be acquired by substituted service upon his agent
or employee if the defendant is doing business within
the forum state . . . "
tc

•••

These statutes, though v;orded differently, are basically
similar to our Utah statute. However, one of the most marked
distinctions existing among the various acts is· that some, like
Iowa, allow service to be had upon non-residents only when
the age11t is doing business out of an office or agency, but
other statutes as are found in Utah, New York, Mississippi
and other states have been held constitutional even though
the business done by the non-resident need not be conducted
from any fixed office or agency. Mississippi recently held a
similar statute constitutional in the case of Condon v. S. (1949),
38 Southern 2d 752.
It must be borne in mind that each statute differs in certain minor respects from those of other states and, consequently,
the facts of each case must be analyzed with respect to their
application to the · particular statute. This is the appellant
has attempted to do throughout the preceding portion of this
brief.
Having heretofore argued the points that the defendant
was doing business by means of agents and in one or more
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places and that this lawsuit arose out of the conduct of business
done in Utah it would be interesting to investigate the trend
of recent cases. To this tin1e the cases on the subject of what
constitutes- doing business are, as stated in 10 ALR 2d 200,
extremely fe\v ... "
Ct

•••

In the case of lVIelt1in Pine & Co. 11. lHcConnell, 273 App.
Div. 218, 76 NYS 2d 279, 10 ALR 2d 194, affd. 298 NY 27,
80 NE 2d 13 7, the agents served in a breach of -contract action
were manufacturer's agents for a co-partnership having its
principal place of business and manufacturer in Ohio. The
New York statute, similar to ours, reads in part as follows:

"When any natural person or persons not residing
in this state shall engage in business in this state, in
any action against such person or persons arising out
of such business, the summons may be served by leaving
a copy thereof with the complaint with the person who,
at the time of service, is in charge of any business in
which the defendant or defendants are engaged within
this state, . . . "
The agents solicited orders as selling agents for the defendant, one receiving a salary plus a commission and the
other being on a strict commission basis, and both being
" ... independent contractors to some extent." Orders solicited had to be accepted at the factory in Ohio before they
became binding. The partnership did not maintain a bank
account, account books, records or office space in New York
state. The sa]es representatives maintained their own offices
at their own expense and represented other firms as well as
the defendant. Checks drawn to the agent's O"\Vn order were
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deposited in .. a special account and_ the pro~~s remitted to
the defendants after deduction of shipping .and other charges.
Upon the foregoing set of facts the New York court held
the defendants to be doing business within the meaning of
· the statute and· that service upon the sales representatives conferred jurisdiction of the pa-rtners. In handing down its decision the court said:
In cases of this sort it is the cumulative significance
of all the activities conducted in this jurisdiction rather
than the isolated effect of any single activity that is
determinative on the question of doing business in
the state . . . "
cc

The New York Court of Appeals, in affirming the desision,
said:
CCDefendants' local activities amply satisfied the longrecognized test of what constitutes engaging in business,
as laid down in the decisions of this court . . . It is
unnecessary at this time, to say \vhether and to what
extent that test may be relaxed in reliance upon the
constitutional principles recently announced by the
Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington (326 US 310) ."
In the case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
US 310, 66 C. Ct. 154 (1945) 161 ALR 1049, the United States
Supretne Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Stone,
held that service of process upon traveling salesmen who merely
solicited orders which were not binding until accepted by the
home office in St. Louis subjected the corporation to the jurisdiction of the State of Washington for the purpose of recovering contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund,
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and that the corporation was doing business in and physically
present in the state. Furthermore, such action did not violate
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In that action the defendant shoe company appeared
specially on grounds almost identical to those raised by the
defendant in this case, particularly specifying that it had no
office in Washington and that its salesmen were on a commission basis only. In response to such argument Mr. Chief
Justice Stone said:
nApplying these standards, the activities carried on
in behalf of appellant in the State of Washington
were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic
and continuous throughout the years in question. They
resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in
the course of which appellant received the benefits and
protection of the laws of the state, including the right
to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights.
The obligation v1hich is here sued upon arose out of
those very activities. It is evident that these operations
establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of
the forum to make it reasonable and just according to
our traditional conception of fair play and substantial
justice to permit the state to enforce the obligations
\vhich appellant has incurred there. Hence we cannot
say that the maintenance of the present suit in the
State of Washington involves an unreasonable or undue
procedure."
In the case of Wein v. Crockett, supra, the law upholding
in personam jurisdiction of non-residents doing business within
this state was amply and carefully discussed and therefore need
not be cited in this brief.
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CONCLUSION
The plaintiff submits that, in view of the facts of this case,
as proved by the evidence and in view of decided law on the
subject, defendant's activities are of such nature that all of the
requirements of Rule 17 (e) are fulfilled and that he should
be required to answer the complaint filed against him in the
Third Judicial District Court of the State of Utah.
Respectfully submitted,
JACK R. DECKER,
GLEN E. FULLER,

Attorneys for Appellant
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